Why does Hebrews 9:16–17 require death, and does its argument concern a covenant or a will?
Why was Christ’s death necessary for the blessings of the new covenant? Hebrews answers through the language of redemption, inheritance, sacrifice, and access to God. At the center of that explanation stand two unusually disputed verses. They appear to say that a testament takes effect only when its maker dies. Yet the surrounding argument concerns covenants inaugurated with sacrificial blood, not the administration of a deceased person’s estate.
The difficulty arises because one Greek word, diathēkē, can refer to a covenant or a will. Does Hebrews briefly illustrate God’s covenant by appealing to a human testament? Does it continue discussing the sacrificial inauguration of covenants? Or does it explain why Christ had to bear the death penalty incurred by those who broke the first covenant? These readings agree that Christ’s death secures the promised inheritance. They differ over how verses 16–17 explain that necessity.
The question should be settled, as far as possible, by the wording and argument together. The context cannot make the difficult life-and-death language disappear; neither should that language detach the verses from the covenant, sacrifice, and forgiveness surrounding them.
From cleansing to the promised inheritance
Hebrews 8:6–13 introduces Christ’s better ministry and the new covenant promised in Jeremiah 31. Hebrews 9 then contrasts the limitations of the first covenant’s sanctuary and repeated worship with Christ’s effective self-offering. His blood cleanses the conscience, enabling service to the living God (9:11–14). Verse 15 explains the connection between His death, His mediation, and the inheritance:
And for this cause he is the mediator of the new testament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance.
— Hebrews 9:15, KJV
The inheritance is not an incidental reward in an otherwise unrelated discussion. It belongs to the book’s account of God’s saving promise: the Son is heir of all things, believers inherit salvation, and Abraham exemplifies the faith of those who receive what God promises (1:2, 14; 6:12–17; 11:8). This inheritance language makes a testamentary illustration intelligible. Nevertheless, inheritance already belongs to the biblical covenant story; its presence does not require a shift to the administration of a will.1
Verse 15 also gives a specifically redemptive purpose to the death: it deals with transgressions under the first covenant. The dispute over verses 16–17 must therefore account for both sides of the sentence: release from transgression and reception of the inheritance. The law-fulfillment study traces the first covenant’s transgressions to Christ’s definitive sacrifice; the inheritance study develops the promised life and home He secures. The present question is how these verses explain the death necessary for those benefits.
For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be the death of the testator.
For a testament is of force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth.
Whereupon neither the first testament was dedicated without blood.
— Hebrews 9:16–18, KJV
The KJV uses “testament” throughout this sequence, including for the first covenant in verse 18. Its English consistency should not be mistaken for a decision that every occurrence refers to a private will. Conversely, the word “testator” in verses 16–17 brings a testamentary interpretation into particularly clear view. To examine the dispute, the underlying Greek must be considered.2
What the Greek wording does—and does not—decide
Diathēkē is familiar in Greek biblical usage as the word for covenant, corresponding to Hebrew berith. It also has an established use for a disposition of property or testament. Abbott-Smith’s lexical entry recognizes the dispute over Hebrews 9:16–17 under both senses. A dictionary therefore establishes that the alternatives are possible; it does not select the right sense in this paragraph.3
Several other expressions carry the argument:
| Greek expression | Basic wording or function | Interpretive question |
|---|---|---|
| tou diathemenou / ho diathemenos | “Of the one who made or arranged it” / “the one who made or arranged it”; forms of the same participle | Is this a will-maker, a covenant initiator or participant, or a sacrificial ratifier? |
| thanaton … pheresthai | A death must be brought forward, established, represented, or borne, according to the proposed reading | Is death being formally established, presented through sacrifice, or endured as a penalty? |
| epi nekrois | A plural expression referring to the dead; explanatory gloss, “on the basis of dead persons or bodies” | Does the plural describe cases of people dying, sacrificial victims, or covenant transgressors? |
| bebaia and ischyei | Firmness or validity, and having force | Does the argument concern an arrangement’s legal standing, its operative effect, or the enforcement of its sanctions? |
| hote zē ho diathemenos | “While the one who made it lives,” as an explanatory gloss | How can a covenant reading account for the maker’s continued life? |
The participle is middle in form. It is not a passive expression meaning “the one who was sacrificed.” An interpretation identifying this person with a sacrificial victim consequently requires an explanation of how that victim establishes or ratifies the covenant. Likewise, interpreting the person as Israel requires an account of why covenant-making language describes the people’s participation rather than God’s initiative. Moo places particular weight on this difficulty.4
The verb pherō can mean carry, bear, or bring forward. Translating its passive infinitive here as “be established” or “be proved” gives the will reading a legal sense. Translating it as “be borne” supports a penalty-bearing account; interpreting it through the presentation of sacrificial death supports an inauguration account. These are contextual proposals, not three interchangeable meanings that the entire phrase must carry simultaneously. Ellingworth accepts the legal interpretation while acknowledging the absence of an exact parallel to this statement; Grindheim disputes that interpretation. The disagreement should remain visible rather than being resolved by choosing one English gloss in advance.5
The plural nekrois is significant but not decisive. It is not the plural of the abstract noun “death”; it refers to the dead. Covenant interpreters see a natural connection with multiple sacrificial victims. Will interpreters understand a general statement about arrangements taking effect when people die. Neither “animals” nor “covenant breakers” is explicitly supplied by the word itself.6
The testamentary illustration
On the will reading, verses 16–17 briefly illustrate the need for death by drawing on another recognized sense of diathēkē. A will may be drawn up during its maker’s lifetime, but the distribution contemplated at death requires that death to occur. The mention of inheritance in verse 15 introduces the illustration; verse 18 returns to the first covenant and its blood inauguration.
Ellingworth and Mitchell defend this interpretation. Moo and Schreiner also prefer it, while expressly acknowledging difficulties. France emphasizes its limited scope: the comparison links diathēkē and death without requiring every participant in a will to correspond exactly to a participant in God’s covenant.7
Its strongest feature is the contrast in verse 17 between death and the maker’s continued life. Read as a statement about a will, that contrast is immediately intelligible. The singular maker does not need to become a collective people, and literal life does not need to become ritual life. Nor does a brief change in a word’s sense automatically break an argument; an author can deliberately use a familiar double meaning to illuminate a point.
The principal objections concern both vocabulary and context. The argument moves from covenant mediation to blood inauguration, and a private testament neither redeems transgressions nor requires sacrificial blood. Covenant interpreters also distinguish a will’s validity when drawn up from the later execution of its provisions. If “firm” and “having force” refer to legal validity, they argue, the claim that a will lacks such force during its maker’s life is problematic. Cockerill and Grindheim further appeal to arrangements whose provisions could operate during the maker’s lifetime.8
Defenders answer that the illustration concerns the ordinary death-related realization of an inheritance, not every legal effect a document might have. That reply preserves a plausible analogy. It also limits the historical claim: Hebrews need not be read as asserting that every ancient arrangement called a diathēkē lacked every kind of effect until death. Deciding the legal objection more precisely would require distinguishing the relevant kinds of documents and practices, rather than citing “ancient wills” as one uniform institution.
The theological correspondence also has limits. In Hebrews the Father appoints the Son heir, and the Son shares the benefits of His work with His people. Christ is not simply a deceased property owner who relinquishes His possessions and ceases to enjoy them. The will interpretation is strongest when it treats death as the point of comparison rather than turning the passage into a complete map of an estate transfer.9
Covenant inauguration through sacrificial death
The inauguration reading retains “covenant” throughout. A death is necessary because a covenant is solemnly established through sacrifice. The dead victims represent the death invoked by the covenant oath: those who bind themselves accept the consequences of violating their obligations. Verse 18 then supplies the scriptural example—the first covenant was inaugurated with blood.
Grindheim develops this interpretation through representative sacrificial death. The maker’s death is set forth in the victim, while the human party remains physically alive. The related phrase about the covenant having force over the dead refers to the slain animals of the ratification rite.10
Genesis 15 and Jeremiah 34 illuminate this background. Genesis describes divided animals and the divine manifestation passing between the pieces. Jeremiah connects passing between the pieces of a calf with the fate of those who violate their covenant. These passages give substantial scriptural grounding to the association of covenant commitment, sacrificial death, and threatened judgment. They are supporting parallels, however, rather than passages explicitly quoted in Hebrews 9:16–17. Exodus 24 is the passage Hebrews actually adduces in verses 19–20.11
Guthrie offers a related but distinct explanation: he identifies the one arranging or ratifying the covenant with the sacrificial animal whose death establishes it. That identification maintains a direct relation between the ratifier and the death. It also carries a particular grammatical burden, because an animal is being described through the language of making or arranging a covenant. This differs from Grindheim’s explanation of a covenant party represented by an animal.12
This family of readings has a strong advantage in the paragraph’s movement. Covenant, sacrificial death, and inauguration continue without a detour into a different institution. The plural dead also fits the sacrificial setting naturally. Its hardest expression remains the final clause of verse 17. The text says the arrangement lacks force while its maker lives. Explaining that as a maker’s ritual or representative death is possible within the proposed symbolism, but the ritual qualification is an interpretive addition. Cockerill himself raises this objection to the general inauguration reading before developing a different covenant explanation.13
The argument should also remain focused on the covenants and rites under discussion. Neither the existence of sacrificial covenant ceremonies nor the Hebrew idiom of cutting a covenant proves that every covenant, everywhere, requires its maker’s death.
A broken covenant and a death penalty borne
Cockerill reads verses 16–17 through the transgressions named in verse 15. The subject is the first covenant as broken by God’s people. Those who entered it incurred its death sanction by violating it; its validity is manifested in the enforcement of that sanction. Christ bears the required death on their behalf. Cockerill develops this account from Scott Hahn’s interpretation.14
This reading gives particular weight to the passive expression “be borne.” The necessary death is described without an express statement that the guilty covenant party must personally undergo it. In the wider argument, Christ’s death supplies redemption. The reading thus connects the necessity of death directly with the problem verse 15 actually names, rather than treating death merely as a condition of transferring an inheritance.
Cockerill also relates this language to the suffering Servant and Hebrews 9:28, where Christ bears sins. That is a meaningful theological connection, especially given the book’s account of Christ’s self-offering. Nevertheless, pherō in verse 16 and the sin-bearing language later in the chapter do not by themselves establish that verse 16 is an allusion to a specific sentence in Isaiah. Grindheim explicitly challenges the sufficiency of that verbal association.15
The reading’s chief difficulty is the amount it supplies. Verse 16 does not explicitly say “broken covenant,” and the participle does not itself mean “covenant breaker.” Verse 18 proceeds to inauguration, not the later punishment of Israel. Cockerill answers that the inauguration foreshadows the sanction incurred by breach. Grindheim and Moo regard that explanation as less natural than their respective alternatives. In particular, Grindheim’s rejection of the broken-covenant interpretation must not be mistaken for a rejection of the covenant reading altogether: his preferred account concerns inauguration.16
Williamson offers a modification. He appreciates the connection between Christ’s death and the penalty incurred by covenant transgressors, but finds the identification of the plural dead with Israel strained. He instead relates the dead to the animals used in ratification, whose deaths anticipated the covenant sanction. This combines a breach-and-penalty explanation with a sacrificial account of the plural. It preserves an important distinction: covenant interpreters need not agree either about who the dead are or about precisely how inauguration and breach relate.17
Verse 18 is the bridge that every reading must cross
“Whereupon” introduces the first covenant’s dedication with blood. The connecting word, hothen, draws an inference from what precedes. Its force makes the relation between verses 16–17 and the sacrificial account in verses 18–22 a central test of interpretation.
For the will reading, the bridge is analogy: death is necessary in the testamentary illustration, and the first covenant likewise involved death, now specified through blood. Ellingworth expressly treats the movement as illuminating analogy rather than strict deduction. For the inauguration reading, the connection is more directly continuous: the principle of sacrificial covenant establishment is exemplified at Sinai. For the broken-covenant reading, the inauguration rite displays the death sanction that explains the need for redemption from covenant transgression.18
The following verses identify the governing scriptural scene:
Saying, This is the blood of the testament which God hath enjoined unto you.
— Hebrews 9:20, KJV
Exodus 24:3–8 describes Moses declaring God’s words, the people pledging obedience, sacrifices being offered, and blood applied in the covenant ceremony. God, Moses, and the people remain alive. That combination supplies both the strength and the challenge of the covenant reading: sacrificial death plainly belongs to inauguration, but the principal covenant parties do not literally die in that ceremony.
Hebrews also includes ritual features not all stated in Exodus 24 itself, such as water, scarlet wool, hyssop, and the sprinkling of the book. Guthrie and Mitchell relate these details to other purification settings. The account brings covenant inauguration into a broader sacrificial and cleansing framework; it should not be treated as a word-for-word transcript of Exodus 24 alone.19
The movement culminates in forgiveness:
And almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission.
— Hebrews 9:22, KJV
The word “almost” qualifies the purification statement. Hebrews’ central comparison concerns the effectiveness of Christ’s sacrificial death, not a denial that the law knows cleansing practices involving water or other materials. The following discussion returns to Christ’s once-for-all offering, and Hebrews 10 again joins the new covenant’s forgiveness with the sufficiency of that offering. A testamentary illustration, if present, serves this sacrificial argument; it does not replace it.20
Weighing the readings
| Reading | Strongest explanatory contribution | Principal interpretive cost |
|---|---|---|
| A will illustrated by its maker’s death | The literal contrast between the maker’s death and continued life; the preceding inheritance language | A brief shift of sense, disputed legal wording, and an analogical return to sacrificial covenant inauguration |
| Covenant inauguration through representative sacrificial death | Continuity with covenant language, the plural dead, and the Exodus 24 example | Explaining why the maker must not be living through ritual representation; identifying an animal as ratifier in Guthrie’s version |
| A broken covenant whose death sanction must be borne | Direct relation to verse 15’s transgressions and redemption, and to Christ’s representative death | Supplying the broken-covenant setting and interpreting the maker as a transgressing party; explaining the transition to inauguration |
The will reading has the clearest immediate account of the maker’s life-and-death contrast. That is a substantial argument, not merely the result of a preferred English translation. The covenant reading has the clearest continuity with the paragraph’s repeated vocabulary and sacrificial example. That is likewise substantive, not merely an insistence that a word can never change sense. The broken-covenant reading connects the death with redemption from transgression especially closely, but requires more than substituting “covenant” for “testament” in English.
No reading should be dismissed by an objection its serious advocates already address. A limited analogy need not make the Father a deceased testator; representative sacrifice need not imply that God literally died at Sinai; a penalty-bearing interpretation should not be accepted simply because substitution is taught elsewhere. The decisive question is which account best explains all the clauses, with the fewest unsupported additions, within the author’s argument.
The paragraph’s central theological claim is firmer than the disputed explanation of these two verses. Christ’s death redeems from transgression, inaugurates the new covenant, and secures the inheritance promised to those who are called. His subsequent living priesthood remains essential to Hebrews’ account of salvation (7:25; 9:24; 13:20). Nothing in a death-related testamentary analogy requires Him to remain dead, and nothing in the covenant alternatives makes His actual death merely symbolic.
Hebrews leads its hearers from that accomplished offering to confidence in drawing near to God (10:19–22). The interpretive dispute concerns how verses 16–17 explain the necessity of death. It does not make Christ’s effective sacrifice, the new covenant’s forgiveness, or the promised inheritance uncertain.
Notes
Hebrews 1:2, 14; 6:12–17; 9:15; 11:8. Douglas J. Moo, Hebrews, Zondervan Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament, on 9:15–17; Sigurd Grindheim, The Letter to the Hebrews, Pillar New Testament Commentary, on 9:15. Inheritance supplies grounds for the analogy but is also an established covenant theme.↩
Hebrews 9:15–20; Paul Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, New International Greek Testament Commentary, on 9:16–18; Gareth Lee Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, New International Commentary on the New Testament, on 9:16–18.↩
G. Abbott-Smith, A Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament, διαθήκη and διατίθημι. The entry explicitly recognizes alternative interpretations of Hebrews 9:16–17. The term’s biblical use does not erase its testamentary sense, and its testamentary sense does not automatically control every biblical occurrence.↩
Moo, on Hebrews 9:16–17 and the substantive notes concerning διατίθημι and φέρεσθαι; Greek, Hebrews 9:16–17. The participle identifies the one making the arrangement; its precise referent remains part of the dispute.↩
Ellingworth, on Hebrews 9:16; Grindheim, on 9:16–17 and the note on φέρω; Alan C. Mitchell, Hebrews, Sacra Pagina, on 9:16; Abbott-Smith, φέρω. Ellingworth acknowledges the absence of an exact parallel to this statement; Grindheim disputes the proposed legal sense.↩
Greek, Hebrews 9:17; Abbott-Smith, νεκρός; Moo, Mitchell, and Ellingworth, on 9:17. The Greek adjective is used substantivally in the plural; deciding its referents requires more than observing its number.↩
Ellingworth and Mitchell, on Hebrews 9:16–18; Moo, on 9:16–17; Thomas R. Schreiner, Hebrews, Biblical Theology for Christian Proclamation, on 9:16–17; R. T. France, “Hebrews,” The Expositor’s Bible Commentary, revised edition, on 9:16–17. Moo and Schreiner state qualified preferences, rather than describing their choice as free of difficulty.↩
Cockerill and Grindheim, on Hebrews 9:16–17. Their historical objections concern contemporary legal arrangements and the distinction between validity and execution; the precise reach of those objections requires examination of the legal evidence, not simply a modern definition of a will.↩
Hebrews 1:2; 2:11–12; Cockerill and Grindheim, on 9:16–17; France and Ellingworth, on the limited scope of the testamentary comparison.↩
Grindheim, on Hebrews 9:16–18. His reading distinguishes the living covenant party from the victim representing that party’s death.↩
Genesis 15:9–18; Jeremiah 34:18–20; Exodus 24:3–8; Grindheim, on Hebrews 9:16–18. The curse interpretation explains the symbolic force of the divided animals; Genesis and Jeremiah are contextual parallels rather than express quotations in Hebrews 9:16–17.↩
George H. Guthrie, “Hebrews,” in Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament, discussion of Hebrews 9:20 and its immediate context. Guthrie explicitly identifies the arranging or ratifying figure with the sacrificial animal; this is not identical to Grindheim’s representative account.↩
Cockerill, on Hebrews 9:16–17, objections to the general covenant-sacrifice interpretation; Moo, on 9:17. Cockerill’s criticism precedes his own preference for the broken-covenant interpretation.↩
Cockerill, on Hebrews 9:15–18, developing Scott Hahn’s broken-covenant proposal.↩
Cockerill, on Hebrews 9:16 and 9:28; Grindheim, note on the proposed Isaiah 53 association at 9:16. The lexical connection alone does not establish a direct allusion.↩
Grindheim and Moo, on Hebrews 9:16–18. Grindheim distinguishes inaugurating a covenant from enforcing the sanctions of an already broken one.↩
Paul R. Williamson, Sealed with an Oath: Covenant in God’s Unfolding Purpose, chapter 7, discussion of Hebrews 9:15–22. Williamson appreciates Hahn’s emphasis on covenant transgression but interprets the plural dead through sacrificial animals rather than Israel’s corpses.↩
Ellingworth, Moo, Grindheim, and Cockerill, on Hebrews 9:18. Ellingworth explicitly describes the transition as analogy; the covenant alternatives give it different forms of continuity. Abbott-Smith, βέβαιος and ἰσχύω, supplies lexical background for the related validity language in verse 17.↩
Exodus 24:3–11; Hebrews 9:19–21; Guthrie, discussion of Hebrews 9:20; Mitchell, on 9:19–21. Other relevant ritual texts include Leviticus 14 and Numbers 19; the comparisons do not establish that every added detail derives from one identifiable written source.↩
Hebrews 9:22–28; 10:1–22; Mitchell, on 9:22; Moo, on 9:18. The paragraph distinguishes inauguration, cleansing, and forgiveness while relating them through sacrificial blood.↩